Essays on the Political Economy of Subnational Public Finances

Author: Rosado Buenfil, Welmar Eduardo

Year: 2017

Degree: Dissertation (Ph.D.)

Advisor: Kiewiet, D. Roderick

Committee Members: Kiewiet, D. Roderick; Alvarez, R. Michael; Ewens, Michael J.; Hoffman, Philip T.

Option: Social Science

DOI: 10.7907/Z94X55VX

Abstract

This dissertation is comprised of three essays addressing the connections between democracy and public finance at the subnational level. Chapter 2 focuses on variation within public expenditure, revenue, and debt at the state level in the United States for the period 1977-2011 seeking to uncover whether there is evidence of efforts by incumbents to manipulate state public finances to influence election outcomes. I find that total public expenditure increased the year before elections, especially during the period 1977-1994, but it is mostly driven by intergovernmental expenditure. Meanwhile, for later years there is a sizable reduction in tax revenue during electoral years, which results a debt increase. In Chapter 3, I extend the literature of political budget cycles at the subnational level to include pension funding. I explore the relationship between state pension funding and gubernatorial elections in the United States for the years 2001-2014. I show that one is more likely to observe the government and other employers undercontributing to pension funds during the pre-electoral year. I also found fluctuations in the pension fund's portfolio composition depending on how close a gubernatorial election is. Finally, in Chapter 4, I investigate whether the credit rating agencies (Fitch, Moody's, and Standard and Poor's) adjust the timing of their ratings as a function of the electoral calendar. I collect a novel database using credit ratings of Mexican states, and estimate panel models for gubernatorial elections in Mexico for 2005-2015. My results indicate that credit rating agencies delay announcing rating downgrades until after elections, especially when elections are very competitive.

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