Signaling Games: Theory and Applications

Author: Banks, Jeffrey Scot

Year: 1986

Degree: Dissertation (Ph.D.)

Advisor: McKelvey, Richard D.

Committee Members: McKelvey, Richard D.; Ledyard, John O.; Sobel, Joel; Wilde, Louis L.

Option: Social Science

DOI: 10.7907/hhm5-8h24

Abstract

This thesis concerns the interactions between asymmetrically informed agents where information can potentially be transmitted through the actions of the agents. Refinements of the sequential equilibrium concept are derived and applied to (i) a model of pretrial bargaining between litigants to a civil suit, where both parties possess private information, and (ii) a model of electoral competition where the voters attempt to deduce the private information held by the candidates.

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