Essays in Behavioral Economics and Game Theory

Author: Fong, Meng-Jhang

Year: 2024

Degree: Dissertation (Ph.D.)

Advisor: Agranov, Marina

Committee Members: Palfrey, Thomas R.; Pomatto, Luciano; Sprenger, Charles David; Agranov, Marina

Option: Social Science

DOI: 10.7907/5xh7-yw15

Abstract

This thesis consists of three papers. Chapter 1 conducts experimental research on individual bounded rationality in games, Chapter 2 introduces a novel equilibrium solution concept in behavioral game theory, and Chapter 3 investigates confirmation bias within the framework of game theory.

In Chapter 1 (joint with Wei James Chen and Po-Hsuan Lin), we investigate individual strategic reasoning depths by matching human subjects with fully rational computer players in a lab, allowing for the isolation of limited reasoning ability from beliefs about opponent players and social preferences. Our findings reveal that when matched with robots, subjects demonstrate higher stability in their strategic thinking depths across games, in contrast to when matched with humans.

In Chapter 2 (joint with Po-Hsuan Lin and Thomas R. Palfrey), we investigate how players’ misunderstanding about the relationship between opponents’ private information and strategies influence their equilibrium behavior in dynamic environments. This theoretical study introduces a framework that extends the analysis of cursed equilibrium from the strategic form to multi-stage games and applies it to various applications in economics and political science.

In Chapter 3, I employ a game-theoretic framework to model how decision makers strategically interpret signals, particularly when they face a utility loss from holding beliefs that differ from their partners. The study reveals that the emergence of confirmation bias is positively associated with the strength of prior beliefs about a state, while the impact of signal accuracy remains ambiguous.

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