Essays on Information Economics

Author: Wu, Fan

Year: 2025

Degree: Dissertation (Ph.D.)

Advisor: Tamuz, Omer

Committee Members: Pomatto, Luciano; Tamuz, Omer; Cvitanić, Jakša; Caradonna, Peter

Option: Social Science

DOI: 10.7907/wm4y-np67

Abstract

This paper on information economics contains three chapters. In the first chapter, we study how to incentivize information acquisition in a principal-agent model. A principal hires an agent to collect information about a state. We study the optimal contract that incentivizes the agent to acquire the most precise information. In the second chapter, we study how to recover information in the selection model. We show that, given the selection rule and the observed selected outcome distribution, the entire outcome distribution can be characterized as the fixed point of an operator, which we prove to be a functional contraction. In the third chapter, we study how to implement randomized allocation rules with outcome-contingent transfers.

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