Desert Under Unequal Conditions: Meritocracy, Luck, and Moral Worth

Author: Hong, Qianhui (Natasha)

Year: 2026

Degree: Other

Advisor: Quartz, Steven R.

Committee Member: None, None

Option: Philosophy

Abstract

[Introduction] Modern liberal societies remain deeply attached to the ideal of merit. We praise people for “earning” their success, assume that unequal outcomes are justified when they track talent and effort, and often treat market rewards as rough indicators of moral worth. Meritocracy is attractive because it seems to solve a real moral problem: it rejects hereditary rank, inherited title, and caste-like privilege without giving up the intuition that choices should matter. If one person studies harder, develops rare skills, or takes entrepreneurial risks, it seems fair that that person should receive some corresponding benefit. Meritocracy therefore presents itself as a reconciliation of equality and freedom. It rejects arbitrary hierarchy while preserving space for ambition, discipline, and responsibility. Yet this appeal already contains a danger: it can slide from the modest claim that agency should matter to the much stronger claim that winners straightforwardly deserve the full advantages they receive (Rawls 1999; Rowlingson and Connor 2011).